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Introduction 
 Ornette Coleman, in an interview with Jacques Derrida, said that he would rather have a 
“human relationship” than a “musical relationship” with the philosopher. But who is to say that 
these are two different types of relationships? 
 The musical and the human are intertwined through our understanding and internalization 
of meaning, relationship to the external, and relationship to the internal. The minor sound of the 
second movement of Beethoven’s seventh symphony can make someone break down in tears, 
while the revelry of John Coltrane’s chord changes in “Giant Steps” can twist the listener’s mind 
in curiosity, no matter how much or how little they know about music. Music, and at its core 
simply sound, is a very human thing. The melody of your friend’s voice can make you calm, the 
wail of sirens can make you anxious. 
 But how can we understand a musical relationship as a human relationship? It is not 
always in meticulously planned out chords that we find the biggest release — perhaps it is in 
what a musician does in the spur of the moment to change the course of the piece, to reveal their 
own self through their interpretation. 
 We can understand improvisation as the act of creating, spur of the moment, an active 
engagement with decision making and real-time ‘composition’ that allows for the musician to 
add their own taste to a piece of music. Purely improvised music can be some of the most 
exciting artwork to engage with, especially if you are witnessing it in real time, as you, the 
listener, have no idea what twist the musician will take next. However, improvised music is not a 
one-sided affair. In fact, it is a great example of the relationship between self and other. 
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 Improvisation offers an understanding of self and other through the analysis of 
interactions in music between one improviser and their audience, one improviser and the other 
improviser(s), and one improviser and their own self. Improvisation allows for the self to be fully 
reflexive and reflective, as well as reactive and acknowledging of the other in the space with 
them. The self and the other are constituted by the assumption that there is some sort of mutual 
acknowledgement taking place between the self and other. If there were not, then the 
improvisation would not work. 
 Through close reading of the introduction to Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception, Tracy McMullen’s essay “The Improvisative,” and Gary Peters’s Philosophy of 
Improvisation, I intend to address what formulates the relationship between the Self and the 
Other in improvisation. Using two case studies, that of “Rejoinder” performed by Ikue Mori and 
Julianna Barwick, and a live recording of John Coltrane performing “Afro-Blue” at Birdland in 
1963, I hope to explore what constitutes the relationship and mutual acknowledgement between 
self and other in improvised music. 
 In Section 1, I will explore Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s offering in the Preface to 
Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty offers an understanding of the self as 
consciousness that is reliant on a form of self-actualization and realization in order to constitute 
the self. This understanding is supported by Merleau-Ponty’s examples of self-reflection, the 
interaction between two selves, and a view of the self as fact in order to form an understanding 
of consciousness as individual, existing for itself. Paul and Pierre are introduced as two distinct 
consciousnesses who exist in the same space for themselves, and by the fact that they both exist 
in this space, can acknowledge each other as individual consciousnesses, selves and others. With 
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a detailed analysis of self-reflection as a means by which the individual consciousness can 
understand its existence, we begin to shed light on how the solo improviser exists as both self 
and other. 
 Tracy McMullen’s essay “The Improvisative” offers an understanding of the relationship 
between self and other as performative and desiring. Though I argue against this notion using 
Merleau-Ponty’s establishment of the self and other as mutually acknowledging, she puts for the 
idea of the improvisative, offering a space that exists within itself. The improviser exists within 
the improvisative, within a specific type of time known as the here and now, and allows for us to 
understand improvisation as a specific space for the self and other to not just acknowledge each 
other, but to also interact. 
 In Section 3, I use the work of John Coltrane, Ikue Mori, and Julianna Barwick as a mode 
of understanding different improvisative spaces. Using Philosophy of Improvisation by Gary 
Peters, I will build an understanding of the improviser as existing within their own work. This, in 
tandem with Merleau-Ponty and McMullen, allows for an understanding of the relationship 
between self and other as existing within itself, deepening the importance of the improvisative 
space. Barwick and Mori’s piece, “Rejoinder,” allows for us to view the relationship between 
improviser and improviser as self and other. This piece, recorded with the two along with an 
engineer and film maker present, allows for a focused-in look at how two improvisers interact, 
and offers an understanding and clear view of their acknowledgement of each other. Coltrane and 
his band, recorded live at Birdland in 1963 offers two understandings of the relationship between 
self and other - that of the improviser and his band, and that of the improviser and the audience. 
Both these show mutual support and recognition, pushing the self to perform to the best of their 
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abilities while still offering some grounding to the other, and the other offering grounding to the 
self. The knowledge that this band has learned how to play with each other and that their work 
extends beyond this one moment in time reveals the symbiotic relationship that the self and other 
form in improvisation. The relationship between performer and audience reveals a new 
understanding of McMullen’s work, expounding upon performativity and pressure (or, as 
revealed, lack thereof) to be acknowledged. I hope to provide an understanding of the self and 
other relationship through an exploration of improvisation, instances of finding home in the 
improvisative, and a musician’s existence within their work. 
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1  
 A phenomenology, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, is a “study of 
experience, or consciousness…Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced by 
the subject or first person point of view.”  Phenomenological philosophy offers an understanding 1
of how the consciousness experiences the world, specifically the external world, though all the 
while keeping the consciousness within itself. Phenomenology works inside the space of 
consciousness, working to reveal how to self experiences the external. Phenomenology is 
normally comprised by a study of sensory experiences, objects, the self, and others. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty uses the introduction of his book, Phenomenology of Perception, to establish a 
definition of what a phenomenology is with relation to self-consciousness, the external world and 
perception of the external world, and experience of the Other. It is important to note here that 
Merleau-Ponty did quite a bit of work in the arts. In fact, in the end of the preface to 
Phenomenology of Perception, he claims 
“Phenomenology is as painstaking as the works of Balzac, Proust, Valéry, or Cézanne—
through the same kind of attention and wonder, the same demand for awareness, the same 
will to grasp the sense of the world or of history in its nascent state.” (PP, 22/lxxxv) 2
Here we can understand that Merleau-Ponty believes art - as the names he mentions all worked 
in written and visual art - perform similar work to the philosopher through their awareness and 
the temporality of the work they produce. Interestingly, for the sake of this project, Merleau-
 Smith, David Woodruff. “Phenomenology.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford 1
University, 16 Dec. 2013, plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, trans. Donald A. Landes. Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge, 2
2014
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Ponty never studied music, philosophically, phenomenologically, or otherwise. I hope in this 
project to use Merleau-Ponty’s Preface to Phenomenology of Perception as a means to 
understanding the relationship between self and other, internal and external, in improvised music.  
Using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach will not only allow for a first-person (Self, 
rather) perspective on improvised music, but allow for a greater internal understanding of the act 
of improvisation. 
 Phenomenology is the study of essences, placing them “back within existence,” an 
“attempt to provide a direct description of our experience such as it is, and without …the causal 
explanations…Phenomenology allows itself to be practiced and recognized as a manner or as a 
style, or that it exists as a movement,” its unity found with “its true sense in ourselves” (PP, lxx). 
However, phenomenology “places essences back within existence and thinks that the only way to 
understand man and the world is by beginning from their ‘facticity’” (PP, lxx).  Merleau-Ponty 
claims that we are “not the result or the intertwining of multiple causalities that determine [our] 
body…or psyche.” We are not a “simple object,” but a full consciousness and “absolute” source 
of our own experience (PP, 8/lxxi). Improvisation is not one by which the self is fully separated 
from the world, but rather is the true interaction between the world and one’s self. We can be 
fully cognizant of an understanding of the self as separate from the world. 
 Phenomenology offers an understanding of the corporeal self that exists for itself, within 
itself. To understand “man and the world” by beginning from their facticity is to believe that the 
Other exists in the world by the fact that the Self exists in the world. Facticity is an 
understanding of truth, a truth that allows for the existence of an other external and separate from 
the self. Phenomenology places consciousness within the world and in conversation with the 
 7
Other. By positing consciousness as both outside and inside the corporeal, and as the sole source 
of the existence of its own consciousness, we can understand that Phenomenology works to 
engage one’s consciousness with the external, bringing the self outside the self while focusing on 
what constitutes one’s own consciousness.  
 To understand what is meant by “unifying” we must dig through Merleau-Ponty’s claim 
that first experiencing oneself revealing consciousness is the basis for unifying. Further, 
consciousness, as unification, posits the world as its spectacle. Consciousness, as I have 
established, is internal and does not require direct acknowledgement from an()other in order to 
exist, but requires an internal understanding of its existence in order to exist. If one must 
acknowledge their own consciousness, no matter how unconscious this acknowledgement is, in 
order for their consciousness to be existent, then certainly the world must be acknowledged in 
order to exist. I mean this to say that because acknowledgement of oneself must come from the 
internal self, acknowledgement of the external must also stem from this same place. Looking 
back to the Pierre/Paul example, Merleau-Ponty points out that there is no ‘conscious’ (meaning 
thought through) acknowledgement of the other. Pierre does not have to think through 
acknowledging Paul as an individual consciousness — he just does, and this comes from Paul’s 
internalized recognition of his consciousness. However, this acknowledgement only occurs if and 
by the fact that there is an external world that they both acknowledge. If they both have 
experience in this external world, perhaps not the same experience but have lived in the same 
world, then they can understand each other’s consciousness because of this somewhat shared 
experience. From here, if these two consciousnesses can acknowledge that there is a shared 
experience of an external world between them, then the external world must exist and be 
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acknowledged in the same way that the two acknowledge each other’s consciousnesses — a 
mutually dependent triangulation. Further, I would like to say that I have established that there is 
a shared acknowledgement here, plain to see, between how the two are acknowledged — as 
consciousness, as the world. These acknowledgements come in tandem, and can thus be 
understood as the same steps taken to acknowledge one as the proposed Other. Finally, unity is 
found here through this dual acknowledgement of the world and the consciousness, thus 
providing an understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s point that “the unity of consciousness is 
precisely contemporary with the unity of the word” (PP, 12/lxxv). 
 Reflective analysis, the process by which the self recognizes the self, is a step toward 
understanding and connecting one’s own experiences into a cohesive understanding of their 
existence. Merleau-Ponty offers reflective analysis as “ceas[ing] to adhere to our experience and 
substitute[s] a reconstruction for a description” (PP, 10/lxxiii). Reflection places itself “within an 
invulnerable subjectivity,” and cannot be “unaware of itself as an event” (PP, 10/lxxiii). Merleau-
Ponty suggests that reflective analysis “works back toward the subject as if toward a condition of 
possibility distinct from our experience,” presenting “universal synthesis as that without which 
there would be no world” (PP, 10/lxxiii) Looking back at the ‘unification’ of consciousness and 
the world, reflective analysis can here be viewed as an understanding of said unification. 
Because reflective analysis is separate, or distinct, from our experience, it offers an objective 
way of looking at the relationship between consciousness and the world without a need for over-
analysis. Perhaps most importantly, reflective analysis moves in the reverse direction with regard 
to “a previous constitution and meets up with…a constituting power that it itself has always 
been” (PP, 10/lxxiii) Reflecting upon what Merleau-Ponty has already claimed, I understand this 
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as a way of understanding our consciousness’s own existence, as something we do not readily 
acknowledge. However, as laid out in the Paul/Pierre example, one consciousness acknowledges 
another without regard for a conscious acknowledgement of said ‘other’. In fact, we 
acknowledge other consciousnesses, outside of our own, as existing because they exist in the 
same world as ours does. Further, reflective analysis may not at all be necessary if we are to take 
Merleau-Ponty’s claim that our consciousness exists by the fact that it is the “absolute source” of 
its own existence. If this is the case, I do not think we need analyze our existence through any 
means, but accept our existence, as our consciousness seems to have already done so. Accepting 
subjectivity as a level of self-recognition, we can understand reflection as a way of viewing 
oneself without outside threat — the invulnerable subjectivity. Looking at oneself in a mirror, we 
are vastly aware of our own existence. This reflection in the case of the invulnerable subjectivity 
is a way by which we can acknowledge our existence, our selfhood, as a stand-alone 
acknowledgement. 
 However, perhaps there is some necessity for reflective analysis, though it may not be as 
conscious as Merleau-Ponty sees to imply. Improvising music as a solo musician, in a room with 
only oneself, is a way by which we can access this invulnerable subjectivity. For the solo 
musician to improvise, they must be vigilantly aware of their own presence, their own 
production, and able to react to the self. Reflection, here, is noticed through listening back, 
listening closely to the self and what the self has produced. Reflective analysis, if understood as 
connecting one’s experiences in order to cohesively understand their experience, is a necessary 
step in the solo improviser’s process. With nothing to respond to but the sounds they have 
produced, the solo musician is forced into reflective analysis through the act of listening. In this, 
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they must react to themselves, understanding that what they are producing in a solo environment 
is a reflection of their own consciousness. If, for example, the solo improviser is using a 
technique such as looping or a program that replays what they have just played, they have a 
literal reflection of their sound to respond to. This loop, though a transmutation of a sound they 
have just played into the digital sphere, is similar to that which we see in a mirror. When we look 
in a mirror, we are not seeing our exact self but a reflection of our self. In the same way, a loop is 
not exactly what we have just played but a mirrored reproduction of what we have just created. 
This also serves as a divergence from the mirror. In the case of the improviser, we must react in 
some way to this reflection of our sound. While reaction to what we see in the mirror may be 
more passive, reaction to the reflection of our sound is inherently active, as we are reacting in 
such a way that implies there will be another reaction soon following. 
 Reflection appears as a “genuine creation,” a change in the structure of consciousness, 
and yet “involves recognizing, prior to its own operations, the world that is given to the subject 
because the subject is given to himself” (PP, 10/lxxiii) This “giving back” from the world to the 
self to the self requires acknowledgement for it to take place. The idea of giving back and 
subsequent acknowledgement and seeing of a genuine creation constitutes selfhood in that the 
self recognizes that what they are seeing, what they are, is their self, their consciousness.  
 Further understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s means by “reflection through” suggests that 
because reflection is always part of what it is reflecting, it has a situated and partial perspective. 
This is to say that although reflection is in part an objective view of the self, reflection’s basis in 
one’s own self. Their ability to gain understanding through reflection causes this reflection to be 
biased toward the self. Because “everything [one] knows about [oneself]” is know through “a 
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perspective that is [one’s] own or from an experience of the world,” the assumption is thus that 
an individual’s understanding of the world comes from their own observations (PP, 9/lxxii). The 
self here is constituted upon the assumption that an individual has experiences that influence 
their understanding of the world. These experiences form the self, making them individual and a 
self-referential self-consciousness. They are able to acknowledge that they have had experiences 
in the world and that these experiences have made them into the person they are. To say this 
causes individuality would only be scratching the surface — instead this allows for 
acknowledgement of the other in a fair and understanding manner. This is not to say that 
observation and reflection are not helpful for the understanding of the self, but rather that they 
are, indeed, influenced by a person’s experience in the world. This is not to say that this closes 
off the opportunity of connection from this bias. This bias, as stated above, is that the self’s 
experiences are true and this truth constitutes this reality. Breaking this to understand that the self 
functions both as a way of understanding the world and existence of the Other constitutes 
acknowledgement. Merleau-Ponty suggests looking at an example of two individual 
consciousnesses acknowledgement of one another in order to fully understand how the self and 
other interact. 
 Merleau-Ponty brings up the example of Paul and Pierre as an example of a unity and 
intersection of their individual consciousnesses. Paul and Pierre are introduced as two individual 
consciousnesses whose mutual acknowledgement of one another is almost unthinking, accepting 
each other’s existence as selves by the fact that they both have experiences in the same world. 
The Paul/Pierre example offers much for the understanding of self and other, and I will return to 
this as a point of reference throughout this project. 
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 As we have established, the self understand’s the world through their own experiences, 
and recognizes that there is an external world. The “perception of the world ‘by Paul’” is not his 
own doing, but the work of his consciousness, a “pre-personal consciousness” performing the act 
of perception, or as I claimed, the work of the self. Bringing in Pierre as the self, we can 
elucidate the self/other relationship (PP, 12/lxxv). Paul’s consciousness is viewed, by Pierre as a 
pre-personal consciousness that engages with the same shared world as Pierre, thus allowing the 
two to not only communicate, but acknowledge each other’s individual consciousnesses. By the 
fact that Pierre acknowledges Paul’s consciousness, Paul, in turn, acknowledges Pierre’s 
consciousness. Merleau-Ponty here lays out the fact that because the two individual 
consciousnesses share experience of the same world world in which they live, they are able to 
connect on that fact and communicate with each other. However, Merleau-Ponty claims that 
insofar as Pierre is conscious and has a sense for himself, there is no need to distinguish himself 
from “another” consciousness. Sensibility is where past experiences inform present knowledge 
and experience, as explained by Merleau-Ponty through an analysis of how an individual 
understand the color red. 
“…my sensation of red is apperceived as a manifestation of a certain sensed red, which 
is in turn sensed as a manifestation of a red surface, which is in turn sensed as the 
manifestation of a red box, which is, in the end, sensed as a manifestation or as a profile 
of a red thing, namely, this book. Thus, this would be the apprehensive of a certain hylè 
[matter] as signifying a phenomenon of a higher degree, the Sinn-gebung [sense-giving], 
the active signifying operation that might be the definition of consciousness, and the 
world would be nothing other than the “significaiton: world.” (PP, 11/lxxv) 
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A sensation is an understanding of what something appears to be, a manifestation of what it is in 
its entirety. There is a matter that signifies that the definition of a consciousness existing outside 
of the internal consciousness, the external that is the product of sensation. This sensation, 
however, is not the basis for what comprises the self, but instead is what makes up the Other, the 
external world. If we did not have such sensations or sense-giving, we would not be aware of the 
external, and thus not be aware of the Other or the external world. Here Merleau-Ponty offers the 
idea that the individual will incorporate past experience into their understanding of the world. 
These past experiences inflect upon present experience and are unique for the individual, because 
the individual is the only one to have had these specific experiences in the world. Because of 
these unique experiences, the individual consciousness does not need to distinguish itself from 
other consciousnesses because these sensory experiences make up their own consciousness. I 
will later explore this in relation to improvisatory practice, but here it is clear that the individual 
is individual in part by his unique sensory experiences in the world.  
 Everyone who is conscious is an immediate presence in the world by the fact that the 
world is a “system of truths,” we share an experience of the world and use this as a matter of 
truth (PP, 12/lxxv). If the world is a system of truths, then those who exist in the world are true 
beings with experiences that are true. Thus, the existence of the other in a world that is a system 
of truths cannot be denied existence. 
 Merleau Ponty asserts: 
 “Reflective analysis is unaware of the problem of others [autrui], just as it is 
unaware of the problem of the world, because from the first flicker of 
consicousness it grants me the power to go toward a truth that is universal by 
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right, and since the other is himself without [thisness], without place, and 
without a body, the [self and other] are one and the same in the true world, 
which is the unifier of minds. There is no difficulty in understanding how ‘I’ can 
think the Other [l’Autrui] because the ‘I’ and consequently the Other [l’Autre] 
are not trapped in the fabric of phenomena and have a value rather than an 
existence.” (PP, 12/lxxv)  
Reflective analysis is here understood as purely within the self. Because it is “unaware of the 
problem of others … unaware of the problem of the world” and is based purely in consciousness, 
functioning to draw the individual self closer to truth, we can understand it as existing in each 
individual but only for the purpose of understanding the individual self’s consciousness (PP, 12/
lxxv). The outcome of this as we have established is an understanding that each Other has an 
individual consciousness. The other is a not a ‘problem’ to understand, but rather an undeniable 
existing consciousness that exists for its own sake, rather than for the sake of the individual self. 
Reflective analysis, and thus the self, is not concerned with why the other exists, instead simply 
taking its existence as fact and going forward from there. The Other, here, is presented as equal 
to the ‘I’ - the self - because they have the same form of being - a being based in value, a being 
not trapped by “phenomena.” The acknowledgment of the other by the self, and the self by the 
other, comes through the self’s ability to acknowledge similarities between the two.  
 Merleau-Ponty has established the self/other relationship as self-realization and 
actualization that places the self and the other on even ground, based in the fact that they both 
have value or, as I would like to say, something to offer. The self is brought about through one’s 
own acknowledgement of their existence, and the spectacle of the world. The self recognizes that 
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there is an external world in which they move, and that this is cause for their existence. The self, 
then, is conscious and has a consciousness that stems from the internal acknowledgement that 
one does, indeed, exist. This type of acknowledgement is brought about by self-reflection and 
reflective analysis that not only offers the ability for one to understand their experiences in the 
world, but also to recognize themselves—a deeper understanding of their selfhood. In tandem 
with this, Merleau-Ponty brings about the Paul/Pierre example as a means of expressing how the 
self/other relationship functions. Paul and Pierre acknowledge each other as self and other by the 
fact that they both, individually, have had experiences in the same world. These experiences 
constitute the self, and constitute the acknowledgment of the other. Contrary to other 
understandings of the self/other relationship, Merleau-Ponty places the self and other on a level 
playing field that understands the differences between the two (individual consciousnesses) while 
also acknowledging that there is the ability for the two to connect and interact in a fair way. The 
‘I’ (self) recognizes the Other as not merely existing within phenomena, but having a value, 
something to offer the ‘I’, and the Other as its own ‘I’ understands the same the other way 
around. 
 Merleau-Ponty suggests that the self is brought into being by and for the self. “I am the 
one who brings myself into being…I am the absolute source [of] certainty of myself for 
myself” (PP, 9/lxxii) This is not to say that there is no need for the other, but the first 
acknowledgement of the self must come from the self. As suggested in the text, Descartes and 
Kant “freed the subject or consciousness by establishing that I could not grasp anything as 
existing if I did not first experience myself as existing in the act of grasping…consciousness [is] 
the absolute certainty of myself for myself” (PP, 9/lxxii). To unpack this, we can understand that 
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there is a level of grasping that occurs when the self is trying to acknowledge the self as an 
individual consciousness. The “grasping” here, illuminated by the claim that “I could not grasp 
anything as existing…” gives light to the idea that there is a level to which there is a perpetual 
struggle between the consciousness and the external world. Grasping here is not grasping at 
straws. The consciousness must engage in the act of grasping as a way of staying in touch with 
one’s own consciousness. To understand this, we must look back to the idea that one must 
experience grasping in order to have absolute certainty “of myself for myself” (PP, 9/lxxii). As 
explored through the Pierre/Paul example, there is no active or conscious decision to 
acknowledge another consciousness insofar as the two exist in and have the same experience of 
the world. Grasping, then, is not an active choice, for grasping here is the active attempt at 
recognizing consciousness. As stated above, if we do not first grasp, we cannot understand the 
external. Our first experience of grasping must be from within, grasping at and grappling with 
our own consciousness and understanding of self. This grasping leaves way for a smoother 
acknowledgement of the external, an act that requires little effort and allows for the self to 
simply acknowledge the other. Grasping is the struggle for selfhood that in turn resolves an 
individual’s conception of their self. Understanding that Paul and Pierre do not have to actively 
work to acknowledge each other’s selfhood and consciousness give truth to the fact that our own 
consciousness’s grasping gives way for acknowledgement of consciousness. 
 Here, we can understand that the act of understanding the self as an individual 
consciousness is not an active choice, but instead an internalized individual understanding. As 
previously stated by Merleau-Ponty, “the absolute certainty of myself for myself” allows for an 
understanding of the external world. However, from here Merleau-Ponty suggests that this 
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“unifying” is nothing “without the spectacle of the world that it unites”. What does this say about 
what we have established with regard to the (lack of) need of personal conscious 
acknowledgement? I propose that this spectacle, put forth by Merleau-Ponty, is an act of 
performativity. However, from my reading and understanding, what Merleau-Ponty is claiming 
about the understanding of self is non-performative. I posit that self acknowledgement, as well as 
acknowledgement of other, is non-performative, but rather passive and not a matter of conscious 
deliberation. 
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2 
 Tracy McMullen claims that “musical improvisation may offer insights into a conception 
of self and other different from the dominant model found in most cultural theory.”  In order to 3
unpack this, one must address the self / other relationship and define it in the context of cultural 
theory. McMullen asks if there is an understanding of the self through “a radical and constitutive 
relation to alterity”, here alterity being understood as otherness (TI, 116). McMullen explains the 
self/other relationship with respect to Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondage,” claiming we must 
conceive of self-consciousness as existing “in and for itself when and by the fact that it so exists 
for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (TI, 117). With this Hegel and 
McMullen claim that the recognized becomes the recognizer, and the acknowledged becomes the 
acknowledger. This understanding of the relationship between Self and Other is not that 
established in Section 1; this understanding is more one sided, implying reliance on the other to 
manifest the self. Self-consciousness is predicated on the fact that there is another self  (an other) 
there to acknowledge your own selfhood. Similar to what Merleau-Ponty claimed, the self 
acknowledges the existence of the self by the mere fact that it is conscious and has experiences 
in the world, externally.  
 McMullen uses Butler to explain the concept of selfhood with regard to dependence, as 
opposed to independence.  
 McMullen, Tracy. “The Improvisative.” The Oxford Handbook of Critical Improvisation 3
Studies, by George Lewis and Benjamin Piekut, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 115-127
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“One comes to ‘exist by virtue of [the] fundamental dependency on the address of the 
Other. One ‘exists’ not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense by being 
recognizable” (TI, 117). 
This seems in contrast to what we have understood Merleau-Ponty claim to be in 
Phenomenology of Perception. Not only did he establish the self as self-actualizing, but the self 
and other as recognizing each other through a fluid understanding that they both have 
experiences in the world, by that fact they both exist as individual selves. McMullen’s offering of 
understanding the relationship between self and other does not stand with the relationships 
within improvised music. The self does not depend upon the other in order to exist, but instead is 
self-reliant. As explained in the previous section, the self’s ability to recognize its own existence 
through corporeal form and a grasping, a struggle to acknowledge the Self’s consciousness, 
allows for the existence of the self. Further, self-consciousness is the self’s acknowledgement of 
its existence, notwithstanding acknowledgement from the other. However, this does bring up an 
interesting point about desire and performativity within the existence of the self. 
  McMullen uses Butler to introduce the idea of the subject as a desiring thing. There is a 
level of this suggested self/other relationship that implies desire - desire is for acknowledgement, 
recognition of the individual self from the other. Here, the desiring self hopes for an 
acknowledgement from outside, creating a “struggle for recognition” (TI, 117). From my own 
understanding and working through of the text, it comes across that this desire complicates 
selfhood. This desire does not allow for recognition of the self in its clearest form, but instead 
requires the recognition of self through the acknowledgement of an other. With the introduction 
of desire, the self/other relationship is “constituted and delimited” through the need for 
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recognition (TI, 117). The self and other only exist in the ‘larger cultural order’ because of a need 
for external validation and recognition. The self/other relationship is hereby delineated to a self 
that exists through the view of an other, external self-consciousness. McMullen explains from 
here Butler’s claim that there is, in essence, a lack of “freedom” and instead a “concrete 
determination and expression” through the existence of the self through the lens of a larger 
cultural order (TI, 117). 
 Though this understanding of the self/other relationship adds a level of externality to the 
self’s ability to recognize itself as an individual being, I do not uphold that this desire is what 
necessarily constitutes the existence of the self. As stated above, this desire brings about a level 
of performativity which neither confirms nor denies the existence of a self. If we take Merleau-
Ponty’s claim as true, as I have written before, the self exists by its acknowledgment of its own 
existence. There are no bells and whistles in this type of acknowledgement, but the 
performativity of the self/other relationship comes into play when desire is introduced. If we 
seek external acknowledgement of our existence, we are put into a space in which we can be 
viewed as an individual. Interaction, then, is deemed performative if the self is seeking this 
external acknowledgement. If we take this as fact, how does this play into McMullen’s 
understanding of the relationship with in improvisation? 
 Musical improvisation is not merely performative, but a deep exploration of the self 
through musical practice. Tracy McMullen introduces the idea of the “improvisative” in 
conversation with, not in opposition to, improvisation. The word improvisative offers a different 
understanding of performativity through her pre-established self/other relationship regarding a 
desire for acknowledgement from the other. Improvisation can be understood as the actual act of 
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improvising, playing music in a free way, on the fly. McMullen claims that ‘improvisative’ offers 
an understanding “not based on recognition or intelligibility…point[ing] toward a space where 
the separation between observer and thing or actor and action is not meaningful” (TI, 118). Here, 
McMullen offers an understanding of how the self/other relationship is presented through the 
improvisative in the terms of “observer and thing” and “actor and action”. However, we read that 
she claims these separations are not meaningful in the space of the improvisative, but this offers 
an understanding of relationships established in improvsative spaces that present a self/other 
relationship to be unpacked (TI, 118). As I will touch on, I do not believe that the self/other 
relationship is not meaningful in improvsative practice, but rather an important relationship that 
levels some sort of hypothetical playing ground between self and other, and clarifies recognition 
between the two (or singular) entitie(s).  
 McMullen proposes the improvisative as a challenge to “intelligibility, thinkability, 
recognition, and desire” (TI, 118). As understood in the context of this essay, the intelligibility 
proposed here is repeatability. As McMullen wrote on Butler, “language needs to be repeated in 
order to be legible,” but the improvisative challenges this notion (TI, 116). McMullen proposes 
that the improvisative, essentially, need not be repeatable, need not be legible. McMullen instead 
suggests that the improvisative is not based in what is thinkable, challenging “forms of knowing 
based on conceptual thought” (TI, 118). Perhaps the most applicable takeaway from McMullen’s 
proposition is that, within the improvisative, there is a “lean toward the subject rather than a 
prevailing lean toward the object” (TI, 118). Her use of the word lean here does not mean that 
there is one way that the relationship between the subject and object nor self and other — in fact, 
the two are not separate.  
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 In the improvisative, there is a focus on what the ‘self’ can do in situations of 
improvisation. However, given the nature of improvisation that I hope to shed light on, there is 
no difference between the self and other, nor subject and object. Instead, as discussed in my 
unpacking of Merleau-Ponty, the two are symbiotic in the sense that they coexist in the same 
world, and sharing in this experience of the world, acknowledge each other. The same is true for 
McMullen’s proposed understanding of the improvisative. 
“The improvisative is not based on recognition or intelligibility. It is not concerned with 
the realm of what is ‘thinkable’; indeed, it challenges forms of knowing based on 
conceptual thought. It is not historical, although it offers a relationship to the past, 
present, and future. What I believe may be the most important in a theorization of the 
improvisative is its lean toward the subject rather than a prevailing toward the object. As 
I hope I will make clear, I say ‘lean’ because, while the emphasis with the improvisative 
may be on what the ‘self’ can do, in the final analysis the self and the other are not 
separate…the improvisative may best be related to the idea of singularity and a type of 
knowing that is non-conceptual.” (TI, 118) 
The improvisative, thus, can be understood as a space in time that exists only for itself, outside of 
worldly understanding or, as McMullen claimed at the beginning of her essay, outside of cultural 
theory. The improvisative offers itself as an option, a space, rather than a specific action or 
decision. The improvisative functions in such a way that allows for the improviser to find 
reflexivity, self-reflection and a meeting of self and other. In the next section of this project I will 
explore specific examples of the improvisative, but for now, we must build an understanding of 
how the self and other function in the improvisative space. 
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 McMullen claims that within the improvisative, there is a lean toward the subject, though 
in the end, the self and other are not separate. However, McMullen’s explanation of this is that 
there is unity of self and other “because they are equally phantasmagorical” (TI, 118). I do not 
take this at face value, as I believe the self/other relationship within the improvisative to be based 
upon a functional relationship of equal recognition as opposed to their hard-to-grasp existence. 
Using Merleau-Ponty we can understand that the self and other recognize each other without 
needing to struggle to do so, this in opposition to the proposed idea that the self and other are 
constantly desiring recognition from the other. The word “lean” is used to signal to the fact that 
the “focus [is] on what the ‘self’ can do” (TI, 118). Because the self is the improviser, or 
specified improviser in a group improvisation setting, the focus is on what they are 
accomplishing and what decisions they are making in that moment. This “lean” then points 
toward self-acknowledgement, that which Merleau-Ponty put forth in Phenomenology of 
Perception. Gary Peters offers that in improvisation, the improviser is entirely “inside” their 
work, without the chance to function as an observer of their work. This serves the improviser 
because in this case what is created is entirely from the self, the improviser. Their existence in 
the improvisative space is not completely internal, however, as the improviser offers themselves 
to the Other in a proposed improvisation. The self here is both inside and outside of their internal 
consciousness. Focusing in on what they are playing while also being able to respond to and play 
against what another improviser offers them. An improviser gives melody or rhythm or harmony 
for the other, and the other provides the same for the self. The self in the improvisative also 
offers recognition and acknowledgement to the other. The self recognizes that the other is 
observing them and reacting to them through the improvisative space. This not only forces the 
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self to reflect upon what they are doing as an improviser, but also reflect upon and react to what 
the other is doing in this space. Thus, the self is both recognizing themselves and the other in this 
space, both as valid actors in the improvisative, and actors that can offer up some good to the 
improviser.  
  Instead of there being a stark contrast or division between the self and other, the two 
meet in the space of the improvisative and function, acknowledging the other’s presence. This 
relationship is possible because of the “here and now” (TI, 119). McMullen writes that “the 
improvisative can be understood as a singular moment, a moment in the ‘here and now’ that 
remains open and in which one does not cohere into the decision” (TI, 119). Decision and the 
here and now come hand in hand, as McMullen explains that brings “both subject and object into 
being” (TI, 119). But how is this possible? It seems that her writing earlier and refutation of 
‘desire’ would imply that ‘deciding’ would fall more in line with desiring acknowledgement than 
creating it, as “deciding or anticipating brings both subject and object into being” (TI, 119). 
McMullen puts forth that the “improvisative is abiding without deciding or anticipating”, as we 
have established it is not based in repetition nor iterability (TI, 119). It exists in the here and now, 
one singular moment outside of the “Other of language” (TI, 119). However, I understand 
‘decision’ to be the spontaneity of momentary pause, allowing for an individual to make a 
decision in the foretold “here and now” in order to have an interaction with another 
consciousness. 
 Though I do agree with most of McMullen’s definition of the improvisative, I believe the 
relationship between self and other to be somewhat different. Though McMullen claims that “the 
self and other are not separate (because they are equally phantasmagorical),”  I do not believe 
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their being “phantasmagorical” is the cause of their unity (TI, 118). Rather, I propose that the self 
and other here are not separate because of what Merleau-Ponty establishes in Phenomenology of 
Perception. Rather than their phantasmagoria being the cause of the self/other unity in the 
improvisative, it is the fact that both self and other have value and exist within the same world 
that causes their unity. Further, the self and other’s ability to acknowledge and interact with one 
another is the reason for their unity. In the improvisative, a space outside thinkability and and 
intelligibility, allows for the full connection between the self and other to move beyond regular 
recognition into a space of trade and acknowledgement. In the improvisative, the “lean toward 
the subject” that McMullen suggests does suggest an interesting understanding of the self/other 
relationship. As she suggested (and I refuted) earlier on, the self relies on the other for 
recognition. However, using Merleau-Ponty I established that the self and other have an equal 
relationship that allows for their recognition to be equal by the fact that they both exist and have 
experiences in the world. However, give the state of the improvisative, there is a level to which 
the lean toward the self comes from the fact that the improvisative allows itself to be a space for 
self-reflection and reflective analysis. Here, this ‘lean’ is purely predicated upon the self’s own 
reflexivity, rather than a focus on the self. In the improvisative, as I will explore through a case 
study in the next section, the individual self reflects upon themselves, and reacts to the other 
improvisers or observers present.  
 However, the self’s focus is on the self, no matter how involved with the other it is. There 
is a level to which the self’s involvement with the other is based in their internal relations. As 
explained by Merleau-Ponty through the Paul/Pierre example, the self and other interact because 
of their shared experience of the world. The self is predicated on an internal relationship, and the 
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relationship to other is brought about by an externalization of this relationship. Thus, the lean 
toward the self is due to the fact that the self’s first relationship is internal. A relationship with 
the other is only made possible by the self’s externalization of this relationship. If there is a lean 
toward the subject in the improvisative, it is not due to unequal acknowledgment or desire, but 
rather the self’s own recognition of the self, their reflection and reflective analysis, rather than a 
need for validation by the other. 
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3 
 With an understanding of what the self/other relationship looks like in, as McMullen 
called it, standard philosophy, I would like now to establish the self/other relationship within an 
improvised music setting. For this purpose, I will be using both the term ‘improvisative’ and 
‘improvisation’ in order to signify two different understandings of what it means for a musician 
to improvise. In this case, ‘improvisative’ will signify a specific moment of improvisation in 
which the self/other relationship is most readily accessible through an understanding of the 
musician’s existence in a space outside time, within only music, a singular moment in which the 
improvisation comes to being. ‘Improvisation’ will signify the actual act of improvising in a 
closed or open setting, meaning for an audience or for oneself. Here, I will look at an example of 
improvisation, that of Coltrane’s solo in “Afro Blue” on the record Live at Birdland, as well as 
“Rejoinder” performed by Ikue Mori and Julianna Barwick. Using Gary Peters’s writing on the 
philosophy of improvisation, our established understanding of the self/other relationship, and 
these examples of improvisation in (recorded) real-time, I will establish an understanding of how 
this relationship presents itself and how it is navigated by those involved.  
 In Chapter 3 of The Philosophy of Improvisation, Gary Peters asks if there is a “failing” 
in the nature of improvisation because “the improviser is inside rather than outside the situation”  4
(PI, 112). By claiming the improviser is inside the situation is to say that the improviser, 
necessarily situated within the improvisative, only exists within that one momentary action of 
improvisation, rather than also existing outside it, as, say, a composer exists outside their work. 
Improvisation is by nature involved and not planned out. Composition occurs when a composer 
 Peters, Gary. The Philosophy of Improvisation. The University of Chicago Press, 2012.4
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writes out specific notes, levels of volume (dynamics), and articulations. Improvisers, on the 
other hand, work in such a way that what they ‘write’ happens in real time as they are 
performing. Improvisation is often used in jazz, the improvisation happening after the main 
melody and over the chord changes of the piece. Free improvisation is when one or a few 
improvisers participate in active listening and active creation, essentially composing a piece in 
real time with each other, and using the strength of those they are performing with to uphold 
their voice. 
 This situation allows for the improviser remain continuously inside that work as the core 
creator, though without the option of listening as an outsider unless listening to what another 
improviser is playing. An improvisers cannot distance themselves from their work, and thus 
cannot view what they are creating in real time in the same way that a non-improvising art 
practitioner can. Peters claims, using Niklas Luhmann, that “where self-observation is always 
already filtered through the observation of the other,” the work “becomes intelligible only when 
one takes into account that they are produced for the sake of observation” (PI, 112) Here, we are 
presented with a sense that the self is found within the improviser, and the other is only found 
through the observer. However, thinking back to McMullen’s claim that the improvisative is not 
intelligible, there is some discord found between these two claims. 
 Peters asks:  
“What reflective insight does [the ability to step outside of work] that is not available to 
the performer? While the dancer cannot physically be in two places at once and thus may 
not see the whole performance there is no reason to believe that an improvisor cannot 
enter into what Niklas Luhmann describes as a ‘second order observation’ where self-
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observation is always already filtered through the observation of the other, thus 
embedding in the work what Luhmann called the ‘observational directives to be 
followed by the observer of that work” (PI, 112) 
Self-observation here allows for the improvisor to be both inside and outside of their work, 
inside and outside of their performance. The ability for the self to be able to self-reflect while in 
the act of creating allows for a self-reflective exploration of their improvisation. Similarly, as I 
will explain with the two examples, the present Other - in the case of improvisation either a 
fellow improviser or the audience - allows for the improviser to in a sense get feedback in real 
time. In this case, the Other will respond through sound to the improviser’s creation, playing 
back quotations of what they just played, or providing a rhythmic or chordal response to the 
improviser. As established by Merleau-Ponty, sensory experience plays a part in the development 
of individual and unique consciousness. In this sense, the improviser has their own 
understanding of what they are producing, and thus their sound is unique and specific to their 
past experiences with music. Their interactions with the Other, then, is influenced and predicated 
upon the understanding that this other improviser has their own experiences and unique, 
individual consciousness. Like the experience and associations with red mentioned in the first 
section, the same is applicable to music through the processes and unique training in music. 
 On the one hand, the observer or audience may find a work to be ‘intelligible’ in the 
sense that it is consumable. This consumption is present through their viewing of the improvised 
work and internalizing of the product produced by the ‘self,’ the improviser. Can we take this 
relationship at face value? Given what Merleau-Ponty suggests in the Pierre/Paul example, I do 
not think it is that simple. As established, Pierre and Paul acknowledge each other’s 
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consciousnesses for and by the fact that they both exist in the same world, and because they both 
have experience in the same world, they do not need to consciously acknowledge one and the 
other’s existence. The self/other relationship here is passive and almost unthinking, with mutual 
acknowledgement. Instead of being presented as an uneven relationship, Merleau-Ponty suggests 
with the Pierre/Paul example that there is an equality between self and other. What Peters seems 
to be suggesting, however, is that the self, the improviser, must produce something for the sake 
of observation in order for the other, the observer, to understand or consume it. Though 
inherently art is made to be consumable by the viewer, observer, or listener, I do not think that 
the self/other relationship in improvised music is predicated upon the consumability or 
intelligibility of an improvised work. 
 As McMullen established in her essay “The Improvisative,” the improvisative exists in a 
space outside understanding and legibility, but as I established, this is not entirely true in the 
translation to the ‘other’ in the improvisative self/other relationship. Though there is a distinct 
unknowingness from the improviser’s end, the observer or fellow improviser, the other, uses the 
improviser, the self’s, action as motive for reaction. (I would like to note here that ‘observer’ can 
be understood as either viewer, audience, or fellow improvisor depending on the situation, but I 
will return to this issue below.) The constant back and forth between improviser and observer 
allows for our understanding of the Pierre/Paul example to translate over to the self/other 
relationship in improvised music. In the same way that Paul and Pierre acknowledge each other 
for the reasons that they do, the improviser and observer acknowledge each other. The 
improviser accepts that they exist and are improvising by the fact that they are in the act of 
improvising and that they have a consciousness (they are the “source” of their own existence). In 
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the same way, the observer acknowledges that they are hearing the improviser in the 
improvisative, and reacting to it through processing or, if the other here is another performer, 
responding to the improviser. Looking back to Peters suggestion that an improviser exists 
entirely within their own improvisative act, seems to be fitting, but I would like to note that the 
other draws the self outside of the improvisation.  
 Peters suggests a “self-reflexivity” that exists within improvisation, a constant and 
incessant need for the self to reflect upon their improvisative act in real time (PI, 112). Merleau-
Ponty has established that reflective analysis exists as a way for one to look back upon oneself, 
and pre-reflection a way for one to understand their own relationship to things outside of their 
own self. Improvisation bridges the two for the improviser, forcing them into a state of reflection 
and pre-reflection, looking toward their relationship within the decisions they are making in 
improvisation, and forcing them into a state of pre-reflection to understand their relationship to 
observer and/or fellow improviser. I say decision because, though McMullen may refute this 
with her claim that the improvisative exists outside of decision, there is a level to which there is 
still cognizant decision making happening in the here and now of the improvisative. There is a 
level of reaction at play within the improvisative — it is not a standalone act within its own 
existence, but a space of the here and now which allows for the improviser to exist within their 
consciousness, and within the world. The improvisative act is that of pre-reflection and reflection 
in tandem, offering interiority and exteriority to the self. Thus, the self/other relationship here is 
based within acknowledgment of the other, as well as interaction with the other through the 
decision of both parties to hear and react to what the other is doing.  
 32
 In the piece “Rejoinder” by Ikue Mori and Julianna Barwick, the two find improvisative 
space within and around the other. Barwick improvises using vocals and a loop pedal, while 
Mori uses electronics, specifically a program called max/MSP, to react, interact, and meld with 
each other. Ikue Mori is an electronic musician who has worked with Bill Frisell among others, 
and primarily works to create her own programs to accomplish the sounds that she wants to 
create. Julianna Barwick is a trained vocalist who works using her voice as an ethereal tone, 
rather than reciting lyrics. The piece begins with Mori’s altered, captured, and interactive sounds 
swirling through the listener’s ear. Barwick enters with a singular rather short note, and the two 
begin their play. Throughout the piece, both Mori and Barwick actively listen and respond to one 
another. In footage of the live, improvised recording of “Rejoinder,” you can see the two of 
them, though not actively looking at each other, reacting to the sound the other is putting out. 
The two, seated facing each other at a table covered with their gear (a pedal, a computer), meet 
in the improvisative space allowing for deeper collaboration in the singular moment. The album 
FRKWYS Vol. 6 is a collection of their improvisations, immediately cut to four different pieces 
after the improvisations completed. 
 “Rejoinder” allows for the real-time, less rehearsed version of the practice of 
improvisation. I have found that it exemplifies, once again, the Paul/Pierre example from 
Phenomenology of Perception, while also proving the active engagement inside an improvisation 
that Peters points to in his text. “Rejoinder” was performed and recorded without an audience, 
with only a cameraman and one can assume an audio engineer. Thus, the other here is specified 
to the other improviser, and the broader listening audience. However, I believe that the fact they 
are only improvising with and for each other, there is a level of mediation that further specifies 
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this instance of the improvisative space. Without the ‘other’ of an audience, Mori and Barwick’s 
freedom to utilize the otherness of each other in this space is exemplified. It would normally be 
difficult to find balance between Barwick’s ethereal vocal loops and Mori’s more percussive 
found sounds, but I argue, because of this specific instance of improvisation, balance is struck by 
the fact that the two are only improvising with and for each other. Here, Peters and Merleau-
Ponty’s ideas about reflection and reflexivity are easily observable as Barwick and Mori engage 
in reflection, the response, and self-reflexivity, the active decision making of the improvisative 
space. Though their sounds are at their core deeply different, Mori and Barwick still manage to 
build reflections of the other through their individual processes. Mori’s sounds soften in the latter 
half of the piece, a response to Barwick’s floating tones, and Barwick, in the first half of the 
piece uses shorter more annunciated sounds to mimic Mori. There is a trade occurring throughout 
the piece that exemplifies their acknowledgement of the other’s process and sound, a decision 
that translates into a cohesive piece of music that exemplifies both Mori and Barwick’s distinct 
sounds and voices.  
 John Coltrane is one of the best-known jazz musicians to have lived, revolutionizing the 
genre by introducing modes of improvised jazz as well as extraordinarily demanding and 
complicated chord changes that have challenged musicians since. Three tracks off John 
Coltrane’s album Live at Birdland were recorded live at Birdland and, perhaps, the best example 
of this performance is found in the track “Afro Blue.” Contrary to “Rejoinder,” “Afro Blue” was 
recorded in front of an audience at a jazz club in New York City, whereas “Rejoinder” was 
recorded in private, a conversation purely between two musicians. Live at Birdland features 
Coltrane, McCoy Tyner, Jimmy Garrison, and Elvin Jones, building and disassembling 
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conversations to the tune of Coltrane himself, and other jazz composers. “Afro Blue,” written by 
Mongo Santamaria, features what I think is the best and purest example of a cohesive jazz 
improvisation. Tyner and Coltrane effortlessly trade off melody and solo, rhythm and tune, 
through the arc of the piece. What is different with “Afro Blue” from “Rejoinder” is not only the 
fact that the improvisation occurs over a set series of chords, but the fact that it also takes place 
in a public setting with an audience present, offering the other side of the self/other relationship 
in improvised music. Here, we will take the self as Coltrane, and the other as both audience and 
band.  
 In the instance of “Afro Blue,” Coltrane takes the second solo, following McCoy Tyner, 
and brilliantly picks up where the pianist left off. The end of Tyner’s solo feels like a vamp, 
playing chords with the same rhythmic components repeatedly through a crescendo that builds 
up to Coltrane’s entrance. Coltrane enters with a slide up to a high note, not only directly 
carrying the energy Tyner had built up through his solo, but translating this energy into his own 
playing style, landing on the high not and falling into rapid note patters moving down the range 
of the saxophone. Coltrane’s self seems to be acknowledging what Tyner has offered him, and 
carrying that through into his solo. Similar to the self/other relationship found between Mori and 
Barwick, Coltrane and Tyner, though taking different solos, sound as if they are in a 
conversation, acknowledging the other’s musicianship. 
 Given the nature of the function of a band in jazz, and given the full history of Coltrane, 
we know that he, Tyner, Garrison, and Jones had played together for a long time before this 
performance at Birdland. Knowing this, we can assume that they not only know each other’s 
playing styles, but they have learned the nuances and how each individual fits into the band, 
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making a fully functional and cohesive unit. Assuming as much, there is probably less thought 
going into fitting together as a group than there had been at the beginning of their collaborations. 
Thus, during Coltrane’s solo, when Elvin Jones, the drummer, catches on to a specific rhythmic 
moment that Coltrane establishes, the moment wows the audience but more than likely was 
hardly any thought for the musicians themselves. Because the relationship between Coltrane and 
his band members has been pre-established, the acknowledgement of the other and the self is less 
of a stressor, but rather comes naturally for the band as a whole. Similar to what is heard in 
“Rejoinder,” in “Afro Blue” there is constant acknowledgement of the other player’s style and 
space noticeable, listening to how Coltrane plays off the lines, rhythms, and block chords the 
other three provide him with through his solo.  
 As Gary Peters points out in his quotation from Luhmann, “the unique meaning of the 
forms embedded in the work of art…becomes intelligible only when one takes into account that 
they are produced for the sake of observation” (PI, 112). In the case of Live at Birdland and 
“Afro Blue,” this was recorded at a live set for an audience, not mediated by a studio or the 
artists being in a space not accessible to the audience or a space only found through listening 
back. There were, in fact, observers present for the creation of this album, and the distinct 
meaning of the album, the decision made by the musicians, and the interpretation of the artist’s 
interpretation, is up for debate by the audience themselves. This presents a distinct self/other 
relationship not present in “Rejoinder,” as I have mentioned before. This relationship instead 
offers the audience a realtime understanding of the pieces performed, instead of the easy “listen 
again” option of recorded music. In the same way, there is a specific type of performativity that 
reveals itself in live recorded improvised music. In the case of Coltrane, in live performance, he 
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has this one specific opportunity to perform for this one specific audience in this specific space at 
this specific time. Whereas, perhaps similar to “Rejoinder,” improvisation can be re-recorded, 
done over, and altered in a recording studio, the performance of improvised music in a live 
setting allows for the self to reach full expression, or come short of the same, through the 
decisions made in real time by the performer. The observer, the other, knows this as the 
excitement of jazz seems to come from the one-time opportunity to see a piece performed live, 
the one-time opportunity to see this specific performance that will perhaps never be heard again 
(as is the nature of improvisation). In a similar fashion, this also offers the self, as we have 
established in this case, Coltrane, the opportunity to be fully self-reflective in his interpretation 
of the piece, and his decisions made in the here and now. 
 This Coltrane example also points to a deeper understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s 
suggestion that the I recognizes other by the fact the two are not bounded by “phenomena,” but 
rather have a “value.” The audience and other improvisers playing with Coltrane both have 
something to offer to Coltrane, the self. As Merleau-Ponty says, “nothing is hidden behind these 
faces or these gestures, and there are no landscapes that remain inaccessible to [oneself]” (PP, 
12/lxxv).  Tyner, Garrison, Jones, and those observers present at the Birdland set have no reason 
to be disingenuous. Instead, these ‘others’ have something to offer to Coltrane presenting as the 
self in this example. Tyner, Garrison, and Jones, are fellow improvisers, offering foot-holds of 
sort for Coltrane to play off of, or responding and reacting in real time to the decisions he is 
making as the band grooves through the head of the tune and solo sections. They offer value in 
that they validate Coltrane’s self, and receive equal validation from Coltrane through the form of 
interaction and trades throughout “Afro-Blue.” The audience, the other example of the Other, 
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offers themselves as observers for the improvisation as a whole, recipients of the offering from 
the self. “Rejoinder” also offers this ‘value’ based relationship that Merleau-Ponty has 
established. Barwick and Mori, in turn, give and offer sounds, created from nothing, to one 
another. Each individually, as the acting self, acknowledge that they are being offered a starting 
point - something to grow from and feed off to create their own interpretations. There is 
crossover, there is trade-off, but what remains is the value-based exchange of the offer. The self/
other relationship here is not the “desiring” that McMullen pointed toward but rather an equal 
trade that establishes the self and other as equal. Improvisation levels the playing field for the 
musician and musician, observer and performer. It is not a tiered relationship aside from the fact 
that the other is outside the self, and the first acknowledgement from the self is for the self. In 
improvisation, this disappears into a giving and receiving, a level playing field for all parties 
involved or present.  
 The act of improvisation manifests a self/other relationship that not only makes equal self 
and other, but allows for the self and other to interact in such a way that the ‘value’, as Merleau-
Ponty coined it, is expressed through their interaction. With an understanding of Tracy 
McMullen’s definition of the ‘improvisative,’ we can understand the interactions between Mori 
and Barwick, as well as Coltrane and his band and the audience, with more clarity. Their 
interactions exist in a space that does not require clear comprehension - as McMullen put it, 
thinkability - nor conception of real time in order to be understood as a clear and definite 
interaction between self and other. Rather, these interactions exemplify a sort of reflective 
analysis of the self and other for the viewer, though the viewer, as a self, may not need 
acknowledge this consciously. Through Barwick and Mori, we can recognize the pure interaction 
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of an individual self, and an individual other. Both Mori and Barwick listen and respond to one 
another, each establishing an ‘I’ through their sounds, while recognizing the value in what the 
Other has to offer. As Merleau-Ponty put forth, the Other and the I have a value rather than 
existence, and through the improvisative space, a space where thinkability and intelligibility are 
not necessary for comprehension, the value is expressed as an offering. This offering is that of 
sound to play off, respond to, grow from. In the case of Coltrane, his band offer him rhythm and 
chordal support, while the audience serves as the observer, someone for Coltrane to perform for 
and push his abilities. The self, here, is established through Coltrane’s melodic lines, sweeping 
solo, and fact that he is the band leader. Anyone else in his band could be considered the self as 
they, too, have distinctive sounds and are being offered melody and rhythm to respond to. The 
self is established as separate from the other, but still deeply intertwined with the other. In the 
improvisative, there is no separation of self and other. The self and other serve the same purpose 
and offer the same amount to the ‘I’ or to the Other, but the distinction comes with whose 
consciousness one is analyzing, or if you are one of the improvisers in the room.  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Conclusion 
 A musical relationship is a human relationship. The self and other constitute humanity, 
reflecting two consciousnesses with mutual acknowledgement. Their presence in the 
improvisative space allows for an understanding that improvised music is based in human 
consciousness, making clear that a musical relationship, at least in this context, is a human 
relationship.  
 The relationship between Self and Other in improvised music, viewed through the lens of 
Merleau-Ponty’s established self and other in Phenomenology of Perception, allows for our 
understanding that the self and other exist in an even, equal space of acknowledgement. The Self 
is able to understand, through reflective analysis, that it exists in an external world and has 
experiences within this world. Because of this, interacting with the Other is fair by the fact that 
the Self and Other both have experiences in the world. Consciousness recognizes consciousness, 
and consciousness can interact through the knowledge that they have a shared experience. Using 
the example of Paul and Pierre, Merleau-Ponty establishes an interaction between two 
consciousnesses who do not have to think twice about the fact that they both exist and are real. In 
fact, this acknowledgement is almost unthinking as they understand, simply, that they are 
interacting in a world and by that fact they both exist. Merleau-Ponty also asserts that the ‘I’ (the 
self) and the Other [Autere] recognize they are not trapped in “phenomena” but rather have a 
value, something to offer, in their acknowledgement. This is a two way street, making it clear 
that there is no imbalance or scarcity in their interactions. Reflective analysis offers no concern 
for the existence of an other, instead taking the Other at existing without question, allowing for 
the self to focus on achieving a higher truth. 
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 The self and other make themselves present in improvisation through a space Tracy 
McMullen calls the imrpovisative. She first establishes an understanding of self and other based 
through Butlerian and Hegelian ideals, claiming that there is a “desire” that drives the self to find 
acknowledgement form the other. However, as I argued, the self and other, exist with an equal 
understanding and equal acknowledgement that creates a space for them to not desire. McMullen 
then proposes the idea of the improvisative as a space existing outside of thinkability with a 
‘lean’ toward the self as opposed to a focus on the other. This allows for us to understand 
improvisation in a way of offering as opposed to taking, wherein the self offers sound to the 
other, and vice versa. McMullen claims that the improvisative exists in the here and now, a time 
different from presence, that requires attention and giving.  
 Gary Peters suggests that the improviser exists fully inside their work, as opposed to a 
composer who exists and works with an outside perspective. This “inside,” however, allows for 
the improviser to be fully within their work, to an extent, within the “here and now” that 
McMullen suggests. Peters suggestion that there is a second order observation happening sparks 
the question of who the observer is. The observer is the other improviser, the audience, giving 
basis for the Self to go off, creating new melodies and more complex systems of engagement for 
the Self and Other. Similarly, perhaps this internal existence can allow for the improviser to 
experience a more specified reflective analysis, such that Merleau-Ponty suggest. Through an 
exploration of the piece “Rejoinder,” improvised by Ikue Mori and Julianna Barwick, we can 
understand that there is a level to which the self and other experience an equal trade of tonal 
suggestion, pushing the other improviser toward reaction to the sound one is making. In the 
Coltrane example, we see the improviser not only engage with the other improvisers, but also 
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engage with the audience. Through this, Coltrane is offered rhythm and chordal support, but also 
pressure from the audience to perform to his fullest extent. These two example show the 
relationship between self and other by expounding upon the internal aspects of improvisation, 
and relation to the ‘other’ in the space with them. By this, we are able to see how the self 
acknowledges other, and other acknowledges self. 
 The relationship between the Self and Other in improvised music is mutual, ongoing, and 
requests presence in the improvisative space. Consciousness is present through the 
acknowledgement of self through what is revealed in an improvised piece of music, and 
acknowledgement of other through interaction and trades of tonality and rhythm.  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